The question for this month's (tomorrow's) discussion group is
"WHAT ARE THE LIMITS OF REASON / RATIONALITY? WHAT ARE THE LIMITS OF SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE? Are these two the same thing? If reason and/or science has limits, why?"
I have a few (not necessarily complete) thoughts. "The limits of reason and science" is a hard question to answer, though I think we can, at least, clarify the question. I'll try to analyze the question and offer a few distinctions that make clearer sense of it.
First, our question can be interpreted in one of two ways, "What are the current limits to reason & science" versus "What are the potential limits to reason & science." The former is a less interesting empirical question; the latter is the more interesting philosophical question. Everyone knows science and other fields of human inquiry have many limitations at present. The real question is which of those limits can be overcome by continued inquiry.
Second, the funniest aspect of this question is that we are using reason & rationality itself to try to answer the question of the limits of reason & rationality. This at first seems strange, though I don't think it's a flaw or contradiction. Science and mathematics, after all, often discover their own limits to the acquisition of complete, total knowledge, prediction and control of reality, e.g., Heisenberg's uncertainty principle, many other weird findings in quantum mechanics, chaos theory, complexity theory, Godel's incompleteness theorem, limitations to the speed of computations, and so on. Information theory says that, in the absence of a conduit of information, some info about events or facts may be forever beyond our reach, due to the very structure of the universe. Many physicists & cosmologists believe this may be true about events that may have occurred "before" the Big Bang, or info about the source of physical laws and physical constants. We just can't get at that information. At this point, these seem like real, final limits, though we can't rule out the possibility that future scientific theories may show them not to be limits after all.
A real limit to science, I think, is the ability of science to answer questions about Values, such as good and bad, right and wrong. Moral philosophers call it "The Naturalistic Fallacy," when you try to reason from "What Is" (the realm of science) to "What Ought To Be" (the realm of values, ethics, aesthetics). This is not a limit to Reason in general, just to science in particular (science being one particular application of human reason).
Third, though we are using reason & rationality itself to try to answer the question of the limits of reason & rationality, we may not be limited to reason & science in answering our question. We can, maybe, use our intuition to arrive at the limits of reason. This brings up an interesting question, "is intuition something other than reason? Or is it just the operation of unconscious reason?" I don't know the answer to that. The very question brings up the inherent vagueness of the terms "reason," "rationality," or most any other term in language worth arguing about. This is an issue in most philosophical controversies and debates.
This distinction bears on the arguments made in a recent book, Malcolm Gladwell's "Blink." He argues that humans have practical limitations when approaching things "rationally." By "rational," he means the conscious process of gathering maximal info and performing drawn-out, careful deliberations. Often, he shows us, the snap intuitive judgments of a true expert are better than the elaborate deliberations of lesser experts. In general, many tasks and judgments are better made quickly, by one's gut or intuitive sense, rather than by a long, rational deliberation, especially when you are under time pressure or other kinds of stress. However, Gladwell's point doesn't argue for the limits of reason, if intuition is the operation of unconscious reason.
A fourth and obvious distinction to be made: the limitations to Science versus limitations to technology. The former seems the more philosophical question. The latter, the more empirical question.
Fifth, one of our regular meeting-goer's, Milan, brought up a very interesting point several months ago. If I understood him right, he was interested in the idea that, in doing philosophy, reason/ rationality is limited, and it is not our only tool. Finn Hansen, our speaker on Socratic Dialogue and philosophical counseling in August, brought up the same point. They both seem to think that, to philosophize well, one must supplement "Reason" (in the sense of "the rules of rational deliberation & logic") with our human form of social Understanding (what some German philosophers have called verstehen, if I'm spelling that right). This is the kind of automatic understanding we use when comprehending language and understanding our social world (if I'm remembering it accurately). Like intuition, it is usually or always a quick, unconscious process. The point they are making, I think, brings up another distinction to be made about the question of the limits of reason. When we say "Reason," do we only mean rational deliberation? Or does Reason include the above faculty of understanding? Off the top of my head, it would seem to me that it does include it. I would guess that rationality and understanding are different forms of "Reason." A very abstract question.
As to the question of why reason & science have the limitations they do, the answer often is "due to the limits of the human mind, attention, memory, time, computational power." This brings up a sixth distinction: when we ask about the limits of reason, do we mean the limits of human reason and/or the limits of the reason of a computer we make? Or, on the other hand, do we mean the limits to Reason itself (the limits to an ideal reasoner)? The former is a question about the cognitive limits (processing power, speed…) of human brains, societies and/or computers. This is, I think, not a question about the limits of Reason itself, but about the limits of Reasoning Power. We may build more powerful computers, or we may engineer more powerful human brains, thus pushing the limits back further. Even then, we have to distinguish between the limits of reason to finite beings versus the ideal limits of reason. You could think of God (if he/she/it exists) as an ideal reasoner, but you don't have to invoke God, since the concept of "ideal reasoner" exists even if never instantiated.
This distinction also applies to the fact, if it is a fact, that humans have limits in the ability to understand and grasp the nature of reality. Colin McGinn and a few other philosophers called "The New Mysterians" argue at length about the inherent inability of human understanding to grasp and solve certain philosophical problems, such as the mind-body problem. This sounds to me like a limit to human reason & understanding, not reason & understanding, per se. I've heard similar arguments put forth by religious thinkers. Only God can grasp reality, but humans cannot, at least not through their own powers. They argue that, perhaps by faith, not reason, God will grant the capacity to grasp some aspects of reality. Even if true, that's only a limit to human reason, which might someday change.
This brings up another possibility: what if the limits to understanding reality aren't due to limits in human reason but due to the fact that the universe is not purely rational or understandable in its structure? What if reality is inherently irrational or incomprehensible? (Is that even possible? Does that even make sense?) Now, that would be a true limit to Reason.
The traditions of philosophical Skepticism and Postmodernism talk a lot about other, real limits to Reason, as well as limits to the ideas of reason, the progress of societies, and other "Age of Enlightenment" ideas. These arguments are about the inherent shortcomings of rationality and its incapacity to guarantee that we've actually arrived at true knowledge, as opposed to educated guesses. That's a really long and tough debate.
"WHAT ARE THE LIMITS OF REASON / RATIONALITY? WHAT ARE THE LIMITS OF SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE? Are these two the same thing? If reason and/or science has limits, why?"
I have a few (not necessarily complete) thoughts. "The limits of reason and science" is a hard question to answer, though I think we can, at least, clarify the question. I'll try to analyze the question and offer a few distinctions that make clearer sense of it.
First, our question can be interpreted in one of two ways, "What are the current limits to reason & science" versus "What are the potential limits to reason & science." The former is a less interesting empirical question; the latter is the more interesting philosophical question. Everyone knows science and other fields of human inquiry have many limitations at present. The real question is which of those limits can be overcome by continued inquiry.
Second, the funniest aspect of this question is that we are using reason & rationality itself to try to answer the question of the limits of reason & rationality. This at first seems strange, though I don't think it's a flaw or contradiction. Science and mathematics, after all, often discover their own limits to the acquisition of complete, total knowledge, prediction and control of reality, e.g., Heisenberg's uncertainty principle, many other weird findings in quantum mechanics, chaos theory, complexity theory, Godel's incompleteness theorem, limitations to the speed of computations, and so on. Information theory says that, in the absence of a conduit of information, some info about events or facts may be forever beyond our reach, due to the very structure of the universe. Many physicists & cosmologists believe this may be true about events that may have occurred "before" the Big Bang, or info about the source of physical laws and physical constants. We just can't get at that information. At this point, these seem like real, final limits, though we can't rule out the possibility that future scientific theories may show them not to be limits after all.
A real limit to science, I think, is the ability of science to answer questions about Values, such as good and bad, right and wrong. Moral philosophers call it "The Naturalistic Fallacy," when you try to reason from "What Is" (the realm of science) to "What Ought To Be" (the realm of values, ethics, aesthetics). This is not a limit to Reason in general, just to science in particular (science being one particular application of human reason).
Third, though we are using reason & rationality itself to try to answer the question of the limits of reason & rationality, we may not be limited to reason & science in answering our question. We can, maybe, use our intuition to arrive at the limits of reason. This brings up an interesting question, "is intuition something other than reason? Or is it just the operation of unconscious reason?" I don't know the answer to that. The very question brings up the inherent vagueness of the terms "reason," "rationality," or most any other term in language worth arguing about. This is an issue in most philosophical controversies and debates.
This distinction bears on the arguments made in a recent book, Malcolm Gladwell's "Blink." He argues that humans have practical limitations when approaching things "rationally." By "rational," he means the conscious process of gathering maximal info and performing drawn-out, careful deliberations. Often, he shows us, the snap intuitive judgments of a true expert are better than the elaborate deliberations of lesser experts. In general, many tasks and judgments are better made quickly, by one's gut or intuitive sense, rather than by a long, rational deliberation, especially when you are under time pressure or other kinds of stress. However, Gladwell's point doesn't argue for the limits of reason, if intuition is the operation of unconscious reason.
A fourth and obvious distinction to be made: the limitations to Science versus limitations to technology. The former seems the more philosophical question. The latter, the more empirical question.
Fifth, one of our regular meeting-goer's, Milan, brought up a very interesting point several months ago. If I understood him right, he was interested in the idea that, in doing philosophy, reason/ rationality is limited, and it is not our only tool. Finn Hansen, our speaker on Socratic Dialogue and philosophical counseling in August, brought up the same point. They both seem to think that, to philosophize well, one must supplement "Reason" (in the sense of "the rules of rational deliberation & logic") with our human form of social Understanding (what some German philosophers have called verstehen, if I'm spelling that right). This is the kind of automatic understanding we use when comprehending language and understanding our social world (if I'm remembering it accurately). Like intuition, it is usually or always a quick, unconscious process. The point they are making, I think, brings up another distinction to be made about the question of the limits of reason. When we say "Reason," do we only mean rational deliberation? Or does Reason include the above faculty of understanding? Off the top of my head, it would seem to me that it does include it. I would guess that rationality and understanding are different forms of "Reason." A very abstract question.
As to the question of why reason & science have the limitations they do, the answer often is "due to the limits of the human mind, attention, memory, time, computational power." This brings up a sixth distinction: when we ask about the limits of reason, do we mean the limits of human reason and/or the limits of the reason of a computer we make? Or, on the other hand, do we mean the limits to Reason itself (the limits to an ideal reasoner)? The former is a question about the cognitive limits (processing power, speed…) of human brains, societies and/or computers. This is, I think, not a question about the limits of Reason itself, but about the limits of Reasoning Power. We may build more powerful computers, or we may engineer more powerful human brains, thus pushing the limits back further. Even then, we have to distinguish between the limits of reason to finite beings versus the ideal limits of reason. You could think of God (if he/she/it exists) as an ideal reasoner, but you don't have to invoke God, since the concept of "ideal reasoner" exists even if never instantiated.
This distinction also applies to the fact, if it is a fact, that humans have limits in the ability to understand and grasp the nature of reality. Colin McGinn and a few other philosophers called "The New Mysterians" argue at length about the inherent inability of human understanding to grasp and solve certain philosophical problems, such as the mind-body problem. This sounds to me like a limit to human reason & understanding, not reason & understanding, per se. I've heard similar arguments put forth by religious thinkers. Only God can grasp reality, but humans cannot, at least not through their own powers. They argue that, perhaps by faith, not reason, God will grant the capacity to grasp some aspects of reality. Even if true, that's only a limit to human reason, which might someday change.
This brings up another possibility: what if the limits to understanding reality aren't due to limits in human reason but due to the fact that the universe is not purely rational or understandable in its structure? What if reality is inherently irrational or incomprehensible? (Is that even possible? Does that even make sense?) Now, that would be a true limit to Reason.
The traditions of philosophical Skepticism and Postmodernism talk a lot about other, real limits to Reason, as well as limits to the ideas of reason, the progress of societies, and other "Age of Enlightenment" ideas. These arguments are about the inherent shortcomings of rationality and its incapacity to guarantee that we've actually arrived at true knowledge, as opposed to educated guesses. That's a really long and tough debate.
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Los Angeles
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Re: Inherent Limits of Reason & Science
Mon, October 17, 2005 - 8:58 PMThanks for the thoughts, Master Facilitator. Again, I'm sorry I missed the roundtable. I'd have loved to hear the various ways people attached themselves to the subject. The subject makes me think of humanity's innate orientation to solving problems and puzzles and how much we rely on appropriate tools and accurate clues. The capacity of our collective analytical mind is at the mercy of context and evolution. I think that's one reason we don't want to die...we want to be around when another piece of the puzzle is found. What are we going to learn tomorrow?
Another thought is that reason/rationality/science have had so little effect on affective behavior. The "Just Do It" campaign is sexy because it appeals to the simplicity of reason: since a+b=c, just do "c." But we don't just do "c." (Uh-oh, reason and free will are bedfellows!)
I just thought of the "seven blind men and the elephant" story.
Life is quite the elephant.
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Re: Inherent Limits of Reason & Science
Sat, April 1, 2006 - 4:09 PM[Typographical note: This web site does not accommodate italicization, for which I will substitute CAPITALIZATION.]
In his 15 October 2005 entry, Brian raises, among kindred issues, the central question: Is knowledge (in the strict, philosophical sense) possible? A useful point of departure here is Descartes. He holds that certain of our ideas, including those we acquire through sense perception, such as that we walk and eat, are unknowable, because a powerful demon could deceive us about such matters--we could be hallucinating. Conversely, Descartes maintains that we CAN know OTHER truths, as an example of which, he cites his famous aphorism "I think, therefore I am." The essence of YOU is your awareness. When YOU ARE aware, YOU ARE. At least in this instance, to think is to be aware. When you think "I think, therefore I am," YOU think; YOU ARE aware; and YOU ARE. "I think, therefore I am," whenever you rehearse it to yourself, is consequently self-confirming, and deception-proof. (Based on these observations, Descartes proposes an axiomatic, quasi mathematical method of philosophy, a means of gaining knowledge, whose most fundamental rule is to receive just utterances (like "I think, therefore I am," and specifically excluding ones based on sense perception) that are so clear as to be irresistible to the mind.)
My own view is that we can know no statements AT ALL (only our raw consciousness itself). For our sense of sureness, of "irresistible clarity," regarding them is ultimately unreliable, in that we could theoretically possess that same sensation about false or meaningless propositions. Many times in a dreaming or half-dreaming state I have thought some concept was utterly clear, and wished to write it down, but, on waking, immediately realized that the idea was nonsensical. Whether or not our PERCEPTION properly corresponds with TRUTH, we have no way finally to CHECK that connection. (Remember, the issue is not, Are we RIGHT?; but, Do we KNOW?) Hence, as to any given proposition I might accept, I BELIEVE that it is TRUE (perhaps even absolutely true), but that I cannot KNOW it. (Since our lack of knowledge pervades every proposition and manner of reasoning, we cannot work around it by avoiding certain forms or modes of thought; and maybe the only helpful prescription along these lines is simply the age-old advice to be self-critical and to think and write as clearly as one can.)
Brian mentions the paradox of the use of reason to determine reason's own limit. But, I concur with Brian, this is no more contradictory than the use of our mind to determine our mind's own limit, in, say, recognizing, late at night, that we would be too tired to read and comprehend a difficult book. Likewise, however, one might contend that my disavowal of knowledge is inconsistent, as follows. If I do not know the truth of ANY proposition, then I do not know the truth of "It is impossible that I know." Ergo, I am leaving open the possibility (or, I believe) that "It is impossible that I know" might be false, and this translates to "It is possible that I know," which contradicts my original position. The flaw in this "paradox" is its assuming (counter to one of our own premises) necessarily that our claims (in this case, "I cannot know") are coherent and that we understand them. If "I cannot know" turned out rather to be something like "Waters enhance the tonic chord," my professed ignorance of the assertion's truth would be entirely consistent. Which confusion we cannot rule out. Consider this analogy. You have a million sheets of paper. On one is written a mystery sentence. The rest are inscribed, "Thrice four is twelve." One page is taken at random and you have no information as to which message it bears. You BELIEVE that the statement thereon is true, but you do not KNOW it; and yet you do not think that "Three fours are twelve" could be false . . .
In answer to a final question, which Brian asks, Is the aforesaid a limit on ALL knowledge, or just on HUMAN knowledge?; I believe that the limitation is an inherent one . . . in a word, that knowledge is impossible.
Postscript: Therefore, GOD is impossible (God, by definition, has knowledge; but knowledge is impossible).
– Richard J. Eisner (4/1/2006; 1-818-343-0123; rjeisner@ix.netcom.com) -
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Re: Inherent Limits of Reason & Science
Sat, December 23, 2006 - 12:58 AMFor Richard.
I. A Short Proof
Start with an assumption, A, that we know that knowledge is this sort of thing. (We do not need to go into details here.) It is important that we recognise that Descartes' argument begins with this implicit claim to knowledge -- the claim to know what it amounts to.
1. A.
Then notice that if we know that knowledge is this sort of thing, then, B, all of our knowledge is called into question. (This is where the details would come in.)
2. If A, then B.
But if all of our knowledge is called into question, then we do not know that knowledge is this sort of thing.
3. If B, Not A.
But then if we know that knowledge is this sort of thing, then we don't know that knowledge is this sort of thing, which is absurd.
4. If A, then Not A.
II. Observations
The proper response to this argument is not to claim that we can have no (or very little) knowledge; that only makes sense if we know that our definition of knowledge is correct, that is, if we know that we are in the epistemic position Descartes presumes we are in -- which being in that position would not permit us to know. The proper response is to recognise that the definition of knowledge we began with does not work and to set about looking for a better way of thinking about these things -- to throw away A as incoherent.
III. Comments on Descartes
The conclusion, that we have no (or very little) knowledge is only sensible if you fail to notice that it rests on a claim, A, to know what knowledge comes to, to have a criterion for knowledge. But if you notice that claim, then you should also notice that the criterion Descartes begins with -- very roughly, that knowledge is incontestable -- is revealed not to count as knowledge by the doubt it gives rise to.
Because Descartes holds on to the criterion of knowledge with which he began, that it should be incontestable, he was driven to the cogito, which seems to be incontestable. But if that is the criterion of knowledge we are working with, then, as we have seen already, we cannot know that the criterion is correct. But if we cannot know that the criterion is correct, then we cannot know that the incontestability of the cogito should let it count as knowledge.
Equating what is incontestable with knowledge, my rough version of Descartes' criterion, can only be an act of ignorance or an act of faith, in either case an optional beginning to thought. It is an act of ignorance if you suppose that this criterion is known and so incontestable, since if that were correct the criterion would cancel itself out as we have seen above. Otherwise it is an act of faith -- and once that is recognised it is open to us to ask about the quality of thinking which is attracted to it and the quality of intellectual projects it produces.
Once you recognise that we do not know that knowledge is incontestable -- that whether or not we should treat only what is incontestable as knowledge is contestable -- the only thing to do is to set about evaluating our contenders.
How are we evaluate them? One way of evaluating our theories of knowledge is relative to how well they make sense of our everyday ways of talking about knowledge and knowing behaviour -- and because different sorts of sense are suitable for different contexts and projects, this will leave us with more than one theory of knowledge; we will employing different theories for different things.
But, of course, it is also possible simply to take it on faith that only what is incontestable counts as knowledge. But know that if you do this, you should expect that most others, who take what we do and how we talk as the topic to be explained and the measure of a satisfying explanation, will tell you that you are not providing a theory of knowledge as it concerns us but rather narrowing your own talk of knowledge down to fit the requirements of your faith.
This orientation to what is incontestable has often been thought to be central to philosophy. Whether or not it is an intellectual orientation worth admiring or pursuing is another question. (My answer is that it is not, because I think the view that nothing is incontestable is the most contestable one we've got. But you wouldn't need to think that much to agree with me; it would be enough to think that some things are indeed incontestable but that they happen to inconsequential things.) -
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How do we translate thought into words and back?
Sun, December 24, 2006 - 9:35 AMDoes anyone know of literature that discusses the question how we map between our thoughts and words? Is this even a recognized philosophical question? Where, for example, would I find a discussion of it on the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philsophy?
I'm not talking about the semantics of language in which one attempts to formalize language. Nor am I asking for a way to formalize our thoughts (although I guess that's closer). The Language of Thought Hypothesis Article (plato.stanford.edu/entries/...thought/) talks about this. I want to take our thoughts as primitive and ask how we map language to them rather than mapping them to a formal language.
Thanks for any suggestions.
-- Russ Abbott -
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Re: How do we translate thought into words and back?
Mon, December 25, 2006 - 3:17 AMI'm not quite sure what you mean, but . . .
A lot of people have thought that formal representations of language capture and reveal more directly the 'thought' they express, but if you wanted to start not from language (or some other expression from which you would 'work back' as it were) but from thought itself . . . well, as soon as I start to think about how I might go about this, I become puzzled.
I think my puzzlement arises because I don't know what I might mean by 'thought'; we have this one word, which is useful enough in a wide variety of contexts, but I'm not sure there is any one sort of thing --- and what sort would it be? a feeling? a voice in my head? patterns? --- which that word is always and obviously pointing at. I suspect the simplicity of language makes me think of 'thoughts' as primitive mental units of some sort which I might get at, arrange, study, or whatever when actually there is nothing going on that can all that usefully be treated in that way.
If I had something, clearly defined, which I wanted to explain --- linguistic behaviour in humans, say --- I might find it useful to posit 'thoughts' as part of my theory of language; I could then understand 'thought' in terms of its role in the theory, which presumably would lend it a measure of unity which its generality in ordinary speech does not.
But in doing this I would not be talking *about* thoughts, as if they were what I was out to explain; I would not have discovered anything. I would simply be introducing a concept, talking *with* the word 'thought', because doing so made it easier to get a handle on some feature or other of language. I would be working back from language to thought in the same way that some people work back from biological change to evolution or God --- and in this case I think that as brain science progresses talk of thoughts will (and in fact does now already) seem rather close to God's end of things.
But I guess you don't want to work back to thought in this way but to start with it. Well, then define what you mean by 'thought' and go on from there. Do you mean basic units of experience? Do you mean formal structures that precede, shape, or frame experience? Do you have something mystical in mind --- the logic of the world or something like that? (I really don't know, you see.) If you said more about this, you'd probably find that someone had gone off in a similar direction before. -
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Re: How do we translate thought into words and back?
Sun, December 31, 2006 - 9:12 AMI don't know that I can define "thought" or "idea." Yet we all have them -- or we wouldn't be writing these messages. For the purposes of my question, it would probably be counter-productive to attempt to define "thought" since it is the externalization of thought in terms of something else that I'm asking about. If I define thought in advance, then I've created an answer to the problem I want to solve. At this point all I can do is take thought as primitive and move on from there. But here are two examples that may help illustrate the perspective from which I'm approaching this question.
* My field is computer science. When people in my field write computer programs we are in some reasonable sense attempting to externalize our thoughts in a language. [In this case the language is executable. Computer languages have two obvious properties that natural language doesn't share: they have a formal semantics (whatever the computer does), and they are very limited -- there's lots of stuff one can't say in them.] We often find that the symbolic expressions we produce do not properly capture our thoughts. In some cases, the failures are referred to as bugs in our programs. In other cases, we simply have not thought through what we wanted to say clearly enough. It's not always a bug; sometimes it's just wrong -- if that distinction makes sense in this context.
* Legal writings (the law) seem to suffer from similar problems. (The law is also "executable" by the executive and judicial branches of government.) We often pass laws that don't do what we expect. Again, there are (at least) two sources of the failure: "bugs" in the law and failure to think through what we really want to say. Often there is a third problem: we say what we wanted to say but the result was the production of unexpected consequences. I'm not talking about this third case, interesting as it is. (Perhaps this can be classified as a subcase of the not-thought-through-thoroughly-enough case.)
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