[Typographical note: This web site does not accommodate italicization, for which I will substitute CAPITALIZATION.]

Following are my rebuttals to four arguments for God’s existence (the summaries of the theistic arguments are taken from the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy).

I. Argument from Contingency (from the article “Cosmological Argument”)

“1. A contingent being exists (a contingent being is such that, if it exists, it can not-exist).
2. This contingent being has a cause or explanation of its existence.
3. The cause or explanation of its existence is something other than the contingent being itself.
4. What causes or explains the existence of this contingent being must either be solely other contingent beings or include a non-contingent (necessary) being.
5. Contingent beings alone cannot cause or explain the existence of a contingent being.
6. Therefore, what causes or explains the existence of this contingent being must include a non-contingent (necessary) being.
7. Therefore, a necessary being (a being which, if it exists, cannot not exist) exists.”

Rebuttal One: On one interpretation, the argument denies, not that contingent beings are caused solely by other contingent beings NOW (after all, we were begot by our parents), but rather that such contingent-contingent causation could go back forever. That is, allegedly there was a time when no contingent things were, and a necessary being was their (exclusive) cause (or the contingent universe as a whole was thus caused). Howbeit, because that which is necessary is and behaves the same in all possible worlds, if a necessary being causes a contingent being, it must do so in every possible universe. But this could not be, as there is a possible world without contingent beings (by definition of contingency). Hence, a necessary being cannot engender a contingent being, and, if God exists and he created man (a contingent being), God is not necessary.

Rebuttal Two: According to another interpretation, the sort of explanation demanded by the argument is the Principle of Sufficient Reason: “a FULL EXPLANATION, that is, an explanation that includes a causal account in terms of sufficient conditions and the reason why the cause had the effect it did.” Again, however, as there is a possible world with a necessary being but no contingent being, the former could not be a sufficient condition for the latter.

Interlude: If God exists, he could not be necessary, for the further reasons that necessary entities are abstract, not actual (there is a possible universe devoid of actual things); and, more particularly, God, by definition, is conscious, and consciousness is not a necessary element—there is a possible world without awareness (which is actual, not abstract). . . . An additional significance of God’s modality is this. Theists argue that, unlike the universe, God needs no explanation, because he is necessary, just as it would be senseless to ask why twice two is four (ergo, God’s non-necessity confronts theists anew with the question “Who created God?”).

Rebuttal Three: Some philosophers read the posited necessary being as, not LOGICALLY necessary, but “metaphysically” necessary. So construed, the argument’s fundamental artifice involves an equivocation on the word BEING, of which The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language gives essentially three meanings: 1 “The state or quality of having existence”; 2 “The totality of all things that exist”; and 3 “A person.” When the argument speaks of the contingent being that exists and needs a cause or explanation, any of the foregoing three senses of “being” is fit. But in the argument’s remarks about the necessary being that causes or explains, the first two definitions of being are appropriate (it seems not unreasonable to suppose that the cause or explanation of any contingent thing might include everything that is, or was, all elements, both contingent and “necessary”); but the third is not (it is a considerable leap, neither required nor supported by the argument’s premises, to suggest that an element that causes or explains contingent beings is person-like). In other words, all we are compelled to grant, if we assent to the argument’s assumptions, is that anything is explained by everything (whatever that encompasses), “being,” in the first and second senses of the term; whereas we are led to think we must accept the existence of “A being,” in the third sense: a cosmic sentient organism (God).

II. Conceptual Argument (from the article “Ontological Arguments”)

(Note: In this “ontological” argument, Saint Anselm refers to God as a being than which none greater can be conceived.) “Thus even the fool is convinced that something than which nothing greater can be conceived is in the understanding, since when he hears this, he understands it; and whatever is understood is in the understanding. And certainly that than which a greater cannot be conceived cannot be in the understanding alone. For if it is even in the understanding alone, it can be conceived to exist in reality also, which is greater. Thus if that than which a greater cannot be conceived is in the understanding alone, then that than which a greater cannot be conceived is itself that than which a greater can be conceived. But surely this cannot be. Thus without doubt something than which a greater cannot be conceived exists, both in the understanding and in reality.”

Rebuttal: The proof is defective in that, by the same logic, practically any nonexistent thing can be conceived into existence, as it were, such as the unicorn, thus: The greatest four-footed creature I can conceive of is a unicorn, which is in my understanding. And certainly the greatest conceivable four-footed animal cannot be in the understanding alone; for it can be conceived to exist in reality, which is greater. Hence if the greatest conceivable four-footed creature is in the understanding alone, then it is not the greatest conceivable one (which would instead be the real one). So the greatest conceivable four-footed beast—the unicorn—exists, both in my understanding and in reality.

Indeed, Anselm argues for the IMPOSSIBLE: a greatest conceivable being makes no more sense than a greatest conceivable number, or amount (whatever the magnitude, a greater is possible). (Moreover, incidentally, if we judge a creator by his work, surely we can conceive of a greater God, one who would not make a world ruled by misery, like the Earth.)

III. Definitional Argument (from the article “Ontological Arguments”)

“God is a being that has every perfection (by definition). Existence is a perfection. Hence God exists.”

Rebuttal: As with “conceptual” arguments, a problem here is that you can DEFINE almost anything, including that which does not, or even cannot, exist.

More specifically, though, nothing (no thing) can have every perfection, because certain perfections pertain only to certain kinds of things. For example, a perfect sonnet has fourteen lines, which perfection (having fourteen lines) presumably is not possessed by God. (And with respect to some traits that ARE relevant to God, such as the ability and inclination to create a happy world, God is not perfect, to say the least.) Further, existence could not be a perfection. If it were, we would have to say, for instance, of a severely flawed painting, that it is perfect, at least insofar as it exists, which is absurd. Nay, arguably, only abstract entities, not actual ones, are perfect. Thus the circle is a perfect form, but circular objects, like car tires, are not perfect circles.

On a related note, Descartes’s concept of a “supremely perfect being” is incoherent, since perfection is not a matter of degree. There is no ultimately perfect thing. Rather, there are an unlimited number of possible perfect, or nearly perfect, things of various degrees of greatness. If something is supreme, it is so in terms of a quality or qualities besides perfection.

In closing this part, I offer the following variation on the definitional argument: God is a being that has every perfection (by definition). Visibility is a perfection. God is not visible. Hence God does not exist. I consider this argument frivolous . . . but no more so than the original.

IV. Kalām Argument (from the article “Cosmological Argument”)

“1. Everything that begins to exist has a cause of its existence.
2. The universe began to exist.
3. Therefore, the universe has a cause of its existence.
4. Since no scientific explanation (in terms of physical laws) can provide a causal account of the origin of the universe, the cause must be personal (explanation is given in terms of a personal agent).”

Rebuttal: Among the classic logical fallacies is the appeal to ignorance, the assumption that a claim must be true if it can’t be shown to be false. The kalām argument employs a version of the appeal to ignorance, to wit: “We can’t explain it; therefore, God.” Which “reasoning” strikes me as transparently irrational, all the more so since the posited being would be even stranger and more wondrous than the world, and, correspondingly, even more in need of explanation, but even harder to explain, thus, far from solving the problem, actually enlarging it. What’s wrong with the simple, elegant, intellectually honest “I don’t know”? And just because I don’t have an explanation, doesn’t mean I must accept YOURS as reasonable, or that the burden shifts to me to disprove it. If I can’t find my car keys, and you propose that an invisible elephant came into my house and stole them, and I reply, “That’s ridiculous”; you can hardly expect me to feel obliged to retract my derision of your theory, upon your rejoinder, “Then where ARE they?!”

Epilogue: “Supernatural” is a word we use in connection with the mysterious to enable ourselves to feel as if we understand it. Of course, our ignorance is thereby just compounded; because we still do not understand, only now we THINK we do.

– Richard J. Eisner (8/31/2008; 1-818-343-0123; rjeisner@ix.netcom.com)